Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance

Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance

Book - 1987
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In numerous crises after World War II--Berlin, Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and the Middle East--the United States resorted to vague threats to use nuclear weapons in order to deter Soviet or Chinese military action. On a few occasions the Soviet Union also engaged in nuclear saber-ratling. Using declassified documents and other sources, this volume examines those crises and compares the decisionmaking processes of leaders who considered nuclear threats with the commonly accepted logicof nuclear deterrence and coercion.

Rejecting standard explanations of our leader's logic in these cases, Betts suggests that U.S. presidents were neither consciously blufffing when they made nuclear threats, nor prepared to face the consequences if their threats failed. The author also challenges the myth that the 1950s was a golden age of low vulberability for the United Stateas and details how nuclear parity has, and has not, altered conditions that gave rise to nuclear blackmail in the past.

Publisher: Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, c1987
ISBN: 9780815709350
0815709358
9780815709367
0815709366
Branch Call Number: D843 .B486 1987
Characteristics: xi, 240 p. ; 24 cm

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